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In the Supreme Court of the United States, Januarfy, 1853.
GEORGE RUNDLE AND WILLIAM GRIFFITHS, TRUSTEES OF THE ESTATE
OF JOHN SAVAGE, DECEASED, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, t8. THE DELAWARE AND RARITAN CANAL COMPANY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.
1. By the law of Pennsylvania, the river Delaware is a public navigable river, held
by its joint sovereigns in trust for the public.
2. Riparian owners in that State have no title to the river, or any right to divert its
waters, unless by license from the States.
3. That such license is revocable, and in subjection to the superior right of the
State to divert the water for public improvements, either by the State directly, or
by a corporation created for that purpose.
4. The proviso to the provincial acts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey of 1771, does
not operate as a grant of the usufruct of the waters of the river to Adam Hoops
and his assigns, but only as a license or toleration of his dam.
5. As by the laws of his own State the plaintiff who claimed under Hoops, could
have no remedy against a corporation authorized to take the whole waters of the
river for the purpose of canals or improving the navigation, so neither can he
sustain a suit against a corporation created by New Jersey for the same purpose,
who have taken part of the waters.
6. The plaintiffs being but tenants at sufferance in the usufruct of the water to the
two States who use the river as tenants in common, are not in a condition to
question the relative rights of either to use its waters without consent of the
other.
7. This case is not intended to decide whether a first licensee for private emolument
can support an action against a later licensee of either sovereign or both, who,
for private purposes, diverts the water to the injury of the first.

This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United
States, for the District of New Jersey. The opinion of the Court
was delivered by
GRIER, J.-The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, are
owners of certain mills in Pennsylvania, opposite to the City of
Trenton, in New Jersey. These mills are supplied with water from
the Delaware River by means of a dam, extending from the Penn-
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sylvania shore to an island lying near and parallel to it, and extending along the rapids to the head of tide water.
The plaintiffs, in their declaration, show title to the property
under one Adam Hoops, who had erected his mill, and bilt a dam
in the river, previous to the year 1771. In that year, the provinces
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey respectively passed acts declaring
the tiver Delaware a common highway, for purposes of navigation
up and down the same, and mutually appointing commissioners to
improve the navigation thereof, with full power and authority to
remove any obstructions whatsoever, natural or a'rtificial, and subjecting to fine and imprisonment any person, who should set up,
repair, or maintain any dam or obstruction in the same. Provided,
"That nothing herein contained shall give any power or authority to the commissioners herein appointed, or any of them, to
remove, throw down, lower, impair, or in any manner to alter, a
mill dam erected by Adam Hoops, Esq., in the said river Delaware,
between his plantation and an island in the said river, nearly opposite to Trenton; or any mill dam erected by any other person, or
persons, in the said river, before the passing of thiq act, nor to
obstruct, or in any manner to hinder the said Adam Hoops, or
such other person or persons, his or their heirs and assigns, from
maintaining, raising, or repairing the said dams respectively, or
from taking water out of the said river, for the use of the said mills
and waterworks erected as aforesaid, and none other."
The declaration avers that, by these acts of the provincial legislatures, the said Hoops, his heirs and assigns, became entitled to
the free and uninterrupted enjoyment and privilege of the river
Delaware, for the use of the said mills, &c., without diminution or
alteration by or from the act of said provinces, now States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or any person or persons claiming under
them, or either of them. Nevertheless, that the defendants erected
a dam in said river above plaintiffs' mills, and dug a canal, and
divertbd the water to the great injury, &c.
The defendants are a corporation chartered by New Jersey, for
the purpose of " constructing a canal from the waters of the Delaware to those of the Raritan, and of improving the navigation of
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said rivers." They admit the construction of the canal, and the
diversion of the waters of the river for that purpose, but demur to
the declaration, and set forth as causes of demurrer:
"That the act of the legislature of the then Province of Pennsylvania, passed March ninth, in the year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and seventy-one, and the act of the then Province
of New Jersey, passed December twenty-first, in the year of our
Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-one, as set forth in
iaid amended fifth count, do not vest in the said Adam Hoops, or
in his heirs or assigns, the right and privilege to the use of the
water of the river Delaware, without diminution or alteration by or
from tlte act of the then Province, now State of Pennsylvania, or
of the then Province, now State of New Jersey, or of any person
or persons claiming under either of them, or of any person br persons whomsoever, as averred in the said amended fifth count of the
said declaration. And also for that it does not appear, from the
said amended fifth count, that the same George Rundle and William Griffiths are entitled to the right and privilege to the use
of the water of the river Delaware, in manner and form as they
have averred, in the said amended fifth count of their declaration.
"And also that as it appears, from the said amended fifth count,
that the river Delaware is a common highway and public navigable
river, over which the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have
concurrent jurisdiction, and a boundary of said States, these defendants insist that the legislative acts of the then Provinces of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, passed in the year of our Lord seventeen
hundred and seventy-one, as set forth in the said amended fifth
count, were intended to declare the said river Delaware a common
highway, and for improving the navigation thereof, and that the
provision therein contained, as to the mill dam erected by Adam
Hoops, in the said river Delaware, did not, and does not amount
to a grant or conveyance of water power to the said Adam Hoops,
his heirs or assigns, or to a surrender of the public right in the
waters of the said river, but to a permission only to obstruct the
waters of the said river by the said dam, without being subjected
to the penalties of nuisance; that the right of the said Adam Hoops
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was, and that of his assigns is, subordinate to the public right, at
the pleasure of the legislature of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or
either of them."
On this demurrer, the Court below gave judgment for the defendants, which is now alleged as error.
It is evident that the extent of the plaintiffs' rights as a riparian
owner, and the question whether this proviso operates as the grant
of a usufruct of the waters of the river, or only as a license or toleration of a nuisance, liable to revocation, 6r subordinate to the
paramount public right, must depend on the laws and customs of
Pennsylvania, as expounded by her own Courts. It will be proper,
therefore, to give a brief sketch of the public history of the river,
and the legislative action connected with it, as also of the principles
of law affecting aquatic rights, as developed and established by the
Courts of that State.
The river Delaware is the well known boundary between the
States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Below tide water, the
river, its soil and islands, formerly belonged to the Crown; above
tide water, it was vested in the proprietaries of the co-terminous
provinces, each holding ad medium filum aquwe. Since the Revolution the States have succeeded to the public rights, both of the
Crown and the Proprietaries. Immediately after the Revolution,
these States entered into the compact of 1783, declaring the Delaware a common highway for the use of both, and ascertaining their
respective jurisdiction over the same. For thirty years after this
compact, they appear to have enjoyed their common property without dispute or collision. When the legislature of either State passed
an act affecting it, they requested and obtained the concurrence
and consent of the other. Their first dispute was caused by an
act of New Jersey, passed February 4, 1815, authorizing Coxe and
others to erect a wing dam, and divert the water for the purpose
of mills and other machinery. The consent of the State of Pennsylvania was not requested; it therefore called forth a protest from
the legislature of that State. This was followed by further remonstrance in the following year. A proposition was made to submit
the question of their respective rights to the Supreme Court of the
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United States, which was rejected by New Jersey. After numerous messages and remonstrances between the Governors and legislatures, commissioners were mutually appointed to compromise the
disputes, but they failed to bring the matter to an amicable conclusion. The dispute was never settled, and the wing dam remained
in the river.
In 1824, New Jersey passed the first act for the incorporation
of the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, for which the Company gave a bonus of $100,000. This act requires the consent of
the State of Pennsylvania; and, on application being made to her
legislature, she clogged her consent into so many conditions, that
New Jersey refused to accept her terms, returned the bonus to the
Company, and so the matter ended for that time. .
Both parties then appointed commissioners, to effect, if possible,
some compact, or arrangement, by which each State should be
authorized to divert so much water, as would be necessary for these
contemplated canals. After protracted negotiations, these commissioners finally (in 1834) agreed upon terms, but the compact proposed by them was never ratified by either party.
In the meantime, each State appropriated to itself as much of
the waters of the river as suited its purpose. In 1827 and 1828,
Pennsylvania diverted the river Lehigh, a confluent of the river
Delaware, and afterwards, finding that stream insufficient, took
additional feeders for her canal out of the main stream of the Delaware. On the 4th February, 1830, the legislature of New Jersey
passed the act under which the defendants are incorporated, and
in pursuance of which they have constructed the dam and feeder
the subject of the present suit.
The canals in both States, supplied by the river, are intimately
and extensively connected with their trade,' revenues, and general
property,- while the navigation of the river above tide water, and
the rapids at.Trenton, is of comparatively trifling importance, being
used, only at times of the spring freshets, for floating timber down
the stream, when the artificial diversions do, not affect -the navigation-. The practical benefits resulting -to both parties, from their
great public improvements, appear to have convinced them that
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further nogotiations, complaints, or remonstrances would be useless
and unreasonable, and thus, by mutual acquiescence and tacit consent, the necessity of a more formal compact has been superseded.
The law of Pennsylvania, by which the title and rights of the
plaintiffs must be tested, differs materially from that of England,
and most of the other States of the Union. As regards her large
fresh water rivers, she has adopted the principles of the civil law.
In the case of Carson vs. Blazer, the Supreme Court of that State
decided that the large rivers, such as the Susquehanna and Delaware, were never deemed subject to the doctrines of the common
law of England, and applicable to fresh water streams, but that
they are to be treated as navigable rivers; that the grants of William Penn, the proprietary, never extended beyond the margin of
the river, which belonged to the public, and that the riparian
owners have, therefore, no exclusive rights to the soil or water of
such rivers ad filum medium aque.
In Shrunk vs. The Schuylkill NYavigation Company, the same
&ourt repeated thk same doctrine, and &hief Justice Tilghman, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, observes, "Care seems to have
been taken, from the beginning, to preserve the waters of these
rivers for public uses, both of fishery and navigation; and the
wisdom of that policy is now more striking than ever, from the
great improvements in navigation, and others in contemplation, to
effect -which it is necessary to obstruct the flow of the water in some
places, and in others to divert its course. It is true that the State
would have had a right to do these things for the public benefit,
even if the rivers had been private property; but then compensation
must have been made to the owners, the amount of which might
have been so enormous, as to have frustrated, or at least checked,
these noble -undertakings."
In the cas. of, The MonongahelNavigation Company vs. Coons,
tia. jMfendaut had eret his mill.under a license, given by an act
of tie Legislature (in 1803) to ririan owners, to erect dams of a
pArtipulW structure, " provided they did not impede the navigation,"
&c. The Monongahela Navigation Company, in pursuance of a
charter granted them by the State, had erected a dam in the Mo-
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nongshela, which flowed back* the water on the plaintiff's mill, in
the Youghogany, and greatly injured it. And it was adjudged by
the Court, that the Company were not liable for the consequential
injury thus inflicted. The Court, speaking of the rights of plaintiff
consequent on the license granted by the act (of 1809,) observed,
"That statute gave riparian owners liberty to erect daum of a particular structure, on navigable streams, without being indictable for
a nuisance ; and their exercise of it was, consequently, to be attended
with expense and labor. But was this liberty to be perpetual, and
for ever tie up the power of the State? Or is not the contrary to
be inferred from the nature of the license? So far was the Legislature from seeming to abate one jot of the State's control, that it
barely agreed not to prefer an indictment for a nuisance, except
on the report of viewers to the Quarter Sessions. But the remission'of a penalty is not a charter, and alleged grant was nothing
more than a mitigation of the penal law."
The case of The Susquehanna Canal Company vs. Wright confirms the preceding views, and decides "that the State is never
presumed to have parted with one of its franchises, in the absence
of conclusive proof of such anintention. Hence a license, accorded
by a public law to a riparian owner, to erect a dam on the Susquehanna River, and conduct the water upon his land for his own private purposps, is subject to any future provision -which the" State
may make with regard to the navigation of the river. And if the
State authorize a company to construct a canal, which impairs the
rights of such riparian owner, he is not entitled to recover damages
from the company.- In that case Wright had erected valuable
mills, under a license granted to him bythe legislature; but the
Court says, "He was bound to know that the State had power to
revoke its license, whenever the paramount interests of the public
should require it. And, in this respect, a grant by a public agent
of limited powers, and bound not to throw away the interests confided to it, is different from a grant by an individual, who is master
of the subject. To revoke the latter, after an expenditure in the
prosecution of it, would be a fraud. But he who accepts a license
from the legislature, knowing that he is dealing with an agent,
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bound by duty not to impair public rights, does so at his risk; and
a voluntary expenditure on the foot of it gives him no claim to
compensation."
The principles asserted and established by these cases ae, perhaps, somewhat peculiar ; but, as they affect rights to real property
im-the State of Pnnsylvauia, they must be treated as binding pre,
cedents in. this Court. It is clear) also, from the application of
these principles to the construction of the proviso under consideration, that it cannot be construed as a grant of the waters of a public
river for private use, or a fde simple estate in the usufruct of them,
"without diminution, or alteration." It contains no direct words
of grant, which would. operate by way of estoppel upon the grantor.
The dam of Adam Hoops was a nuisance when it was meade, but as
it did little injury to the navigation, the commissioners, who were
commanded to prostrate other nuisances, were -enjoined to tolerate
this. The mills of Hoops had not been erected on the faith of a
legislative license, as in the cases we have quoted, and a total revocation of it would not. be chargeable with the apparent hardship and
injustice, which might be imputed to it in those cases. His dam
continues to be tolerated, and the license of diverting the water to
his mills is still enjoyed, subject to occasional diminution from the
exercise of the superior right of the sovereign. His interest in the
water may be said to resemble a right-of common, which, by custom,
is subservient to the right of the lord of the soil; so that the lord.
may dig clay pits, or empower others to do so, without leaving sufficient herbage on the common. Bateson vs. Green, 5 T. R. 411.
Nor can the plaintiff claim by prescription against the public for
more than the act confers on him, which is at best impunity for a
nuisance. -His license, or rather toleration, gives him a good title
to keep up his dam, and use the waters of the river, as against
every one but the sovereign, aid those diverting themby public
authority for public uses.
It is true that the plaintiffs' declaration in this case alleges that
the waters diverted by defendants dam and canal, are used for the
purpose of mills, and for private emolument. But as it is not
alleged or pretended that defendants have taken more water than
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was necessary for the canal, or have constructed a canal of greater
dimensions than they were authorized and obliged by the charter
to make, this secondary use must be considered as merely incidental
to the main object of their charter. We do not, therefore, consider
the question before us, whether the plaintiff might not recover damages against an individual or private corporation diverting the water
of this river to their injury, for the purpose of private emolument
only, with or without license or authority of either of its sovereign
owners. The case before us requires us only to decide that, by the
laws of Pennsylvania, the river Delaware is a public navigable river,
held by its joint sovereigns in trust for the public; that riparian
owners of the land have no title to the river, or any right to divert
its waters, unless by license from the State. That such license is
revocable, and in subjection to the superior right of the State to
divert the water for public improvements.
It follows necessarily from these conclusions, that whether the
State of Pennsylvania claim the whole river, or acknowledge the
State of New Jersey as a tenant in common, and possessing equal
rights with herself, and whether either State, without consent of
the other, has, or has not, a right to divert the stream, it will not
alter or enlarge the plaintiff's rights. Being a mere tenant at sufferance to both, as regards the usufruct of the water, he is not in a
condition to question the relative rights of his superiors. If Pennsylvania chooses to acquiesce in this partition of the waters for
great public improvements, or is estopped to complain by her own
acts, the plaintiff cannot complain, or call upon this Court to decide
questions between the two States,. which neither of them sees fit to
raise. By the law of his own State the plaintiff has no remedy
against a corporation authorized to take the whole river for the
purpose of canals, or improving the navigation; and his tenure and
rights are the same as regards both the States.
With these views, it will be unnecessary to inquire whether the
.compact of 1783, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, operated
as a revocation of the license or toleration implied from the proviso
of the colonial acts of 1771, as that question can arise only in case
the, plaintiff's dam be, indicted as a public nuisance.
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. Nor is. it necessary to pass any opinion on the question of the
respective rights of either of these co-terminous States, to whom
this river belongs, to divert'its waters, without the consent of the
other.
srThe question raised is not without its difficulties; but, being bound
to -resolve it by the peculiar laws of Pennsylvania, as interpreted by
her own Courts, we cannot say that the Court below has erred in
its exposition of them; and, therefore, affirm the judgment.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, February, 1853.
ASPDEN vs. ASPDEN.
The Supreme Court wll not order the re-argument of a case once decided, on motion
of Counsel, but only where some one of the majority of the Court expresses a
doubt and desires a re-argument. It makes no difference that the decision of
affirmance was by a divided Court.

This case went up on appeal'from the Circuit Court for the Eastern Distridt of Pennsylvania, was argued in May, 1851, and held
under advisement during the following vacation. On the 14th of
December, 1852, the decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed, but
the Supreme Court declined giving any opinion, at length, upon the
points involved, as the affirmance was the result of an equal division
of the Judges. The next day after this decree, a special order of
the Court was made, directing a mandate to issue to the Circuit
Court, dertifying the affirmance of its decree by the Supreme Court.
,Under these circumstances, a printed petition was filed on the
25th of February, 1853, by Messrs. Wrm. B. Reed, Thos. A. Budd,
f. J. Williams, J.Randall and TFm. Bawle, asking a rehearing
upon behalf of a portion of the former appellants, being the English
claimants a parte paterna.
The petition, after setting forth the facts, argued' that the prayer
was justified by the uniform practice of the High Court of Chan1

The Court did not listen to arguments, and the following points and authorities

are reported from briefs prepared on both sides, and which would have been used
had the Court consented to hear argument on the motion. It is thought that they
may be useful to the profession.-Edr.
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cery in England, which allows a rehearing as a matter of course,
upon the certificate of counsel, and which practice had been adopted
by this Court by a rule promulgated in 1791. 2 Mad. Ch. Pr.
483. 2 Smith's Ch. Pr., 26 to 36. 2 Chit. Gen. Prac. 585 to
604. Galton vs. Hancock, 2 Atk. 439. 3 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1603 to
1622, 1649-50. Blake's Ch. Pr. 165 .Baxton vs. Wilson, 2 Atk.
152. N1oor vs. Moor, 1 Dick, 66.
II. That the practice of the House of Lords, if different from
this, is no guide for this Court, because, before a cause can reach
that tribunal, it has been so fully investigated by the inferior
courts, that in case of an equal division, the decision below may be
safely allowed to remain unreversed. Ram. on Leg. Judg., 9 Law
Lib., p. 123, sec. 5, also p. (18.)
III. The issuing of a mandate under an erroneous impression of
its propriety, and which mandate still remains unexecuted, can
interpose no obstacle to a rehearing.
IV. The organization of the Court with an unequal number of
judges, was intended by Congress to avoid the necessity. of affirmances upon an equal division.
V. Till the close of the term at which a decree is pronounced,
,the whole case must remain in the breast of the Court, and in all
cases where a rehearing has been refused, it has been asked for
after the close of the term in which the decree was pronounced.
[Citing all the cases of refusal which will be found below in argument of Appellees.]
VI. In the United States Courts a decree is held to be enrolled
as of the term in which it is pronounced, and in construction of law,
a term is but a single day. Story's Pl. 320-1, see. 403. Jacob's
Law Die. Cunningham's Law Die. Burns' Law Die., Title Term.
On behalf of the appellees, it was argued by Messrs. W. A.
Jackson, J. L. Newbold and J. Ht. Read,
I. That it is the settled practice of this Court never to rehear a
cause, after it has been transmitted to the Court below to carry into
effect the decree of this Court. Browder vs. M'Artiur, 7 Wheat.
58 ; Ex parte Sibbald vs. The United States, 12 Pet. 492 ; Martin
vs. Runter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Himeley vs. Bose, 5 Cranch,
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319; Skillern vs. May,'16 Ci~nahj,'267, ; ffudson--,

.tier,

7

Cranch. 1 ; Scott vs. B/az'nie,'1 .Bald.-287;' .Jackso vs, A8hton,::lO.
Pet. 480; Maireg vs.' TN7:UnteZ Stdtea, 8Fbw,6,.% :iA,'-ll
II. That this principle 'has nve6rbee: departed from,, except in
cases of a "mere clerical error' 1 :or-.wb!6thejudgment.has been
surreptitiously or irregularly 6btainedL rBank ofifentucky :vs.
P.
-8o150rns1aw,
Wister, 8 Pet. 431; Lz-parte"Andson.
, ,
r
119.
III. That the fact of the ,Court, being . qallyr divided, can make
no difference as to the conclusiveness. of,the fflrmance ,uponcthe
rights of the parties. .The Anteb2e ,( 10 Whbat. 66,126,; ,.tthing
vs. Bank of the United',tates,,11 Wheat.,.-59,i,7T;, 748asington
Bridge Co. vs. Stewdrt, 3 How 413, 424 ; 1 Chittyhs Archbold,
384,, 876; Macqueen's 'Pac.,fHouseo of.,LbrdsI-Y27 ;,, !ornley vs.
.leetwood'1 Strange 318 ;:Deghton vs. G. enville, 1.ShoW. $5.
IV. That the practice of the High Court bfMhancery, is:inapplicable, because this Court hs,',never dbpteid Jtha, practice, except
,a'd~thel*e~enf hhs been-shdwn
where they have none oftheir ,6wn,;
not to be such a cas'e.' , BrufS: dven if Yferied- ita, ItU practice of
Chancery is entirely inconsi teit withTheorye.othefbtitoner,
since a rehearing'is never rantedtliere aft~r~the decre has be~n
onde enrolled, and the 'case br6-ugh 'before~anfappellatef tribunUl;t ,2
,i
2
Diu. Oh. Pr. 1220, Peik. Ed. "3ba;:1615-160;6 402.,
isin
.LotaO..nceU.ri
What ii commbnly allhed'an, appeul , ic the
reality, nothing but, -a e-heariig, and an',only-be, grautedhefoie
enrollment. Law Rev Nbv. i852,p;.' f153 2 a'h.'Ch.PrA228i
9iaw
2 Chit. Gen. Pr. 601 ; DimS .al
',"',':o 'u,
Times R. 817, (June 1852.)
pr4etiede as sooi is it
n
That i decree' i eolled'ythJEnghs&
be 6mes a record'i the! cause ancd,-s plead~ble'riletween te,:paxties; and the d6c66,1 in 'the: preflt 'ca'e, havkngbeen iemittecto
Ibeing :ther'-reboi'ded ilieingfminal iii its mature,
the Court below, 'id
ana pleadAable 'assuch betweeith&simic partdsJhnistbe6bnsidered
abeen'stri-a
asorprad1enrd1le 1 sofatr
eh
havng
t'iae

......

V. That the jurisdiction of this Court being an appellate one, is
22
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strictly analogous to the appellate jurisdiction of the Lords, and
that such a prayer as this would, in the House of Lords, be treated
as a "mere irregularity." Macqueen's Treatise on the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, p. 447, 436, 443. Tommey vs.
Mf ite, 3 Clark's House of Lords' Cases, 68; Bright vs. Hutton, 3
Clark's House of Lords' Cases, 341; Macqueen's Pr. 438.
They also cited Stat. 14 and 15 Viet. Ch. 83, See. 9, Ab. of
Stat. 20 Law Jour. R. In re clark, 21 Law Jour. R. Ch.p. 20;
Turner vs. "Turner,19 Law Times R. 15; Seagrave vs. Pope, 16
Jur. 1099; Blair vs. Bell, 16 Jur. 1103.
On the 28th of February, the opinion of the Court refusing the
motion, was delivered by C.J. TANEY, as follows:
"1In the case of Aspden vs. Aspden, the Court have considered
the application for a re-hearing made upon Friday last. I am instructed to say in regard to it, what has been repeatedly said upon
similar motions, both at the present and at former terms. The
Court have established it as their practice, that where a case has
once been argued and decided, they will not consent to rehear it,
unless one of the Judges, who concurred with the majority, should
find that he had committed an error, and should wish for an opportunity of reviewing his decision. In the present case, upon account
of the importance of the questions involved, the Court not only listened to a prolonged argument, but, having considered it during
the last term, thought proper, under the operation of a curia advisari vult, to hold it under advisement during the vacation. When,
therefore, the decree was affirmed, it was understood that each
member of the Court had definitely made up his mind, and was
not likely to alter it. Since then we have seen no reason to change
our opinions.
"1It may be proper to say a few words in regard to the practice of
-granting rehearings in England, which has been relied upon in
support of the motion. The analogy is not correct. The English
Courts of Chancery which allow this, are exercising an original, not
an appellate jurisdiction. It is true that a first rehearing may there
be claimed as almost of right upon the application of counsel, and
the cause is sometimes prolonged to a third and fourth hearing. But
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these are exclusively in Courts of original jurisdiction, and are therefore, technically speaking, re-arguments rather than re-hearings.
" But, even independently of this distinction, we think the English
practice has very little to recommend it. The expenses of litigation, thus prolonged, are oppressive and often ruinous to suitors,
and have thrown reproach upon the whole system of Chancery
jurisprudence. It would ill become this Court to introduce into
their practice a tedious and costly system, which the most eminent
of the law reformers in England are, at this very time, doing their
utmost to rid themselves of. We cannot afford to employ one term
in re-hearing cases which have been decided at a previous term.
The motion is therefore over-ruled."
Rhode Island Supreme Court, March, 1852.
MOUNT VERNON BANK VS. CHARLES M. STONE.

1

Where a bill makes charges of fraud which are not established at the hearing, the

bill will be dismissed, notwithstanding it states other grounds upon which relief
might have been granted, if not blended with the allegations of fraud.

The Mount Vernon Bank was a bank located in Foster, and the
defendant was from the 8th of June, 1844, to the 29th of May,
1850, their agent for the purpose of transacting the business of the
Bank in the City of Providence, where the plaintiffs provided him
with an office and books, to be kept in the office in which to record
the business of his agency, and they paid hi&i as such agent, a
salary of five hundred dollars per annum. The bill alleged first,
that the defendant had not fully accounted and had refused to
deliver and exhibit the books of the bank to the plaintiffs, and in
the second place, charged that the defendant fraudulently concealed the said books, fraudulently used the money of the bank,
and by fraudulent representations obtained a release or discharge
of a portion of said account, and a surrender of the bond given for
the faithful discharge of his duties as agent. The bill prayed for
a decree for an account, a delivery of the books of the bank, a sur-

I This

case will be found in 2 R. L Rep. 129, printed, but not yet published.

We

are indebted to Thomas Durfee, Esq., the State Reporter, for the printed sheets of
his forthcoming volume.

340

RECENT AMERICAN CASES.

render of the release obtained from the plaintiffs, and a return of
the bond.
The-opinion of the Court was delivered by
GREENE, C. J.-The bill in this case alleges the appointment of
the defendant as agent of the plaintiffs, and states the business
which he was to transact in that capacity. It alleges the purchase
of books by the defendant, in which to record the business of his
agency, and that such books were paid for by the defendant with
the moneys of the plaintiff, and that the books are the property of
the plaintiffs. The bill then alleges that the defendant has refused
to deliver or exhibit to the plaintiffs, the said books of account, and
that defendant has used the money and other property, and credit
of the plaintiffs, while acting as such agent, by loaning the same
and otherwise, and received therefor divers sums of money, for
which he has not fully accounted to the plaintiffs.
The bill then charges as follows, viz :-" That the said Stone
fraudulently conceals said books of account from the plaintiffs, and
hath removed the same from the office and place of business of said
agency founded as aforesaid by the plaintiffs ; and that said Stone
had received large sums of money belonging to the plaintiffs, and
traudulently retained portions of the same and appropriated the
same to his own use and benefit, and that the said Stone in the
accounts he has rendered the plaintiffs from time to time, hath
made fraudulent representations of his conduct and proceedings, to
wit :-among others, that he hath represented that he hath received
smaller sums of money for interest, than he did in fact receive
as such agent, and by means of such false and fraudulent representations, hath deceived the officers and the agents of the plaintiffs, and hath obtained from them a certain release and discharge
of a portion of said account, and surrender of a bond executed by
said Stone, for the faithful discharge of the duties of said agency.'
The bill, among other things, prays that the defendant may be
decreed to surrender and cancel the release and discharge by him,
held from the plaintiffs, and to return the bond executed by him
and his sureties, for the faithful discharge of his duties in his said
agency.
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After a careful examination of the evidence in relation to the
charges of fraud, we feel bound to say, that the plaintiffs, in our
judgment, have failed to prove them; and the only question which
remains to be considered in the cause, is, whether the bill ought to
be dismissed or sent to a master for an account, with the liberty to the
plaintiffs to prove an error or mistake in the settlement which has
heretofore been made, and with receipt or release given, and executed by them, and also to prove any matters of claim not embraced
by said settlement. This would be the ordinary course of the
Court on a bill, by the principal against his factor for an account.
The difficulty in pursuing this course in the present case, arises
from the charges of fraud contained in the bill.
We think these charges the principal ground of relief set forth
in the bill, and we cannot permit the plaintiffs, after having failed
to prove the fraud, to fall back on the allegation, that the defendant
has not accounted, and has not produced and delivered his books-of
account, and to treat the case as if no allegation of fraud was made.
The rule in relation to this subject is stated by the Court in the
case of Price v. Berrington, (7Eng. L.&Eq. R. 260.) "When the
bill sets up a case of actual fraud, and makes that the ground of
the prayer for relief, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree, by
establishing some one or more of the facts quite independent of
fraud, but which might, of themselves, create a case under a totally
distinct head of equity from that which would be applicable to the
case of fraud originally stated." And the same principal is recognized in Parralyv. Hobson, (22 Eng. Oh. R. 255,) and in (laseat
v. Lang, (Ibid, 801.)
We think the rule is founded in the highest justice. A plaintiff
ought not to be permitted, considering that a Court of Chancery is
always open to allegations of fraud, to speculate upon the chances
of relief upon that ground, and failing in .that, to fall back upon a
different ground.
Bill dismissed with costs, without prejudice, except as to the
charges of the fraud.
NoTm:.-In the subsequent case of Masterstone vs. Finnegan the same rule was
applied by the same Court. This was a bill in equity for partition of a lot of land,
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of small value, in the suburbs of the City of Providence. The parties were both
ignorant and illiterate, and had taken their joint deed of the lot to a person, and
requested him to write a division of it for them to execute. lie wrote a very informal memorandum to this effect upon the back of tile deed, and they signed it; but
this division did not describe the whole lot, and so a part was left undivided. The
plaintiff filed her bill to set aside this partition as being imperfect, informal, and insufficient in law, and as injurious to her, because it left a part of the lot undivided,
and of this part the defendant had taken exclusive possession of, afid claimed it as
his own. This the plaintiff denied, and stated in her bill that the above memorandum of division was obtained from her by fraud and imposition of the defendant, as
she could not read nor write: and she prayed the Court to set aide the partial partition, and order a new and valid one of the whole lot. The Cout were not convinced of the fraud and imposition upon the evidence, nor that the defendant had
any exclusive title to the undivided portion of this lot; and consequently dismissed
the plaiatilf's bill as to setting aside the imperfect partition, (and in fact held that
to be valid,) with costs, because the charge of fraud was not proved, and on the
authority of the above case of Al. V. Bank rs. Stone. But they sustained the bill
as to the portion of the lot not embraced in the parol partition; but the plaintiff's
misfortune in this regard is, that this portion is but nineteen feet wide, and the
same degree unfortunately confirms the defendant in his portion under the parol
partition. which chances to lie between the plaintiff's portion and the new strip to
be assigned to her nine and a half feet wide. What she sought was, to have a new
and proper partition of the whole upon any of the grounds of her bill. But from
the remarks which fell orally from the Chief Justice, in the case of Whitman vs.
Holden, &c., at the same term, it would seem the rule established in the two preceding cases is not to be rigidly applied to all cases, but it must depend much on
the circumstances of the case at bar; and the Courtwas understood so far to qualify
the preceding cases, as to intimate that the charge of fraud must be gross or wanton,
and appear to be made from bad motives, in order to preclude the party making it,
from relief on other grounds alleged and sustained in the same bill.-Be orter's . ote.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, December Term, 1852.
DAVID MEKONKEY'S APPEAL.
1. Where one devises all his real estate for life, and all his personal estate absolutely, "having full confidence that his wife will leave the surplus to be divided
at her decease justly among her children," the words do not of themselves import
a trust, nor will they be so construed without other expressions to control them.
2. Words in a will expressive of desire, recommendation, and confidence, are not
words of technical, but of common parlance, and are not prima fade sufficient to
convert a devise or bequest into a trust; and the old Roman and English rule on
this subject is not a part of the common law of Pennsylvania.
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3. Such words may amount to a declaration of trust when it appears from other
parts of the will, that the testator intended nqt to commit the estate to the
devisee or legatee, or the ultimate disposal of it to his kindness, justice or
discretion.

This was an appeal from the decree of the Orphans' Court of
Chester County. The Supreme Court had already had the matter twice before them, in the cases referred to in the opinion.
The litigation had lasted many years, and the paper books and
reports, etc., were voluminous; but it is only necessary to state
two of the propositions of the many, made by the appellant's
counsel for an understanding of the judge's opinion, which proceeded upon a construction of the words of the will.
Isaac Pennock died in February, 1824, leaving a Will dated Jan.
1, 1824, and a codicil without date, both proved April 5, 1824.
In this Will he made a bequest to his wife, in the words quoted in
the opinion.
For the appellant, Messrs. P. J. Smith and H. J. Williams.
For the appellees, .Messrs. J. J. Lewis and J. X. Bead.
For the appellant it was contended,-lst, That the children of
Isaac Pennock having, during the life of his widow, Martha Pennock, acquiesced in her claim of ownership of his personal estate,
having permitted her to treat it and dispose of it as her own, having accepted gifts from her of the identical property, and also other
gifts and benefits both in her life and by her Will, on the basis of
the property being her own, they are estopped from setting up a
claim.
And the council cited, 1 Greenleaf on Ev., §§ 22, 26, 211, 237;
1 Sugd. on Pow., 576, 2 Id., 170; Carr vs. Wallace, 7 Watts,
400.
2d. The extent of the obligation imposed by the third clause of
Isaac Pennock's Will on his wife, Martha Pennock, was that she
should by will divide the surplus of his personal estate amongst
his children, in such proportions as accorded with her notions of
justice, and that the language of the Will did not raise a trust.
And the counsel cited Wright vs. Atky/ns, 1 Yes. & Bea. 313;
2 Roper on Legacies, 301; Brown vs. Stiggs, 4 Yes. 711; Forbes
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vs; Ball, 3 Merr. 437; 1 Sugd. on Pow. 394; 31arboroughl vs.
Godolphin, 2 Yes. Sr. 60; Butcher vs. Butcher, 9 Yes. 397;
Boyle vs. Peterborough, I Yes. Jun. 310; Lysaghl vs. Boyse, 2
Sch. & Lef. 154; J-anderzlee vs. Acklon, 4 Yes. Jun. 785 ; Kemp
vs -Yep, 5 Yes. 859; Spencer vs. 81peneer, Id. 368; lacey vs.
Shermer, 1 Atk. 389; Bax vs. Whilbread, 1 Yes. Jun. 24; 1
Sugd. on Pow. 568; 2 Roper on Legacies, ch. 21, § 6, Wood vs.
Cox, 2 My. & Cr. 684, 690; Pope vs. Pope, 10 Sim. 1; Wynne
vs. .Hawkins, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 179; Pushman vs. Filleter, 3 Yes.
Jun. 7 Sugd. Law of Prop. 262, 2 Sto. Eq. Jur. § 1069; Shaw vs.
Lawless, 5 C1. & Fin. 159; Knott vs. Colter, 2 Phillipps Ch. Ca.
196; -enden vs. Stephens, 3 Id. 149.
For the appellees, it was contended that the language of the Will
created a trust, and that Mrs. Pennock became thereby a trustee
for her children, because, 1st, the subject matter of the trust was
certain; 2d, the objects of the trust certain; and 3d, the words
sufficient to raise it.
The council cited Co. Litt. 272 b, Chudleigh's Case, 1 Rep. 121,
1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 602; 1M-assey vs. Sherman, Amb. 520.
They also cited, to show that precatory words created express
trusts as completely as imperative words in the Roman law, whence
they contended it was adopted into the English Courts, the following
authorities. Gaius' Inst. § 247, 249; Just. Inst. B. 2, tit. 24, § 3;
Cooper's Just. 186; 2 Domat, B. 3, tit. 1, § 4; Id. § 8, Art. 47, p.
82; Id. B. 4, tit. 2, § 1, Art. 2, 3, p. 141-2; Id. B. 5, p. 211,
225, 233; 2 Colquhoun's Summ. Rom. Civ. Law, § 1148, p. 165;
Bowyer's Com. on Mod. Civ. Law, C. 25, p. 150; 1 Spence Eq.
Jur. 488; 2 Id. p. 5.
To the same effect they cited Wright vs. Atkyns, 17 Yes. 255,
19 Yes. 299, Coop. Ch. Cas. 111, S. C., Sugd. Law of Prop. 376,
S. C.; Xeredith vs. Heneage, 10 Price, 230; Harding vs. Glyn,
1 Atkyn, 469, 2 Wh. & Tud. Eq. Cas. 686, S. C.; .Huskisson vs.
Budge, 20 Law Jour. Rep. N. S. 209, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. Cases, 180,
S. C. ; Brqgs vs. Penny, 16 Jur. 93, 8 L. & Eq. Rep. 231, S. C. ;
Wade vs. Mallard, 16 Jur. 492; Constable vs. Bull, 3 De Gex. &
Smale, 411, 20 Law Times, 60 S. C.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LOWRIE, J.-This case has already been twice before this Court,
and the action of the Court on those occasions is reported in Coates'
Appeal, 2 P. S. R. 129, and in Mekonkey's Appeal, 13 Id. 253.
In both those instances, the will of Isaac Pennock has undergone
the construction of this Court, in so far as relates to the rights
here in controversy; and now, when the cause comes on for final
determination, we are asked by the appellants to hear them again on
their rights, under that will, before the door of justice is forever
shut against them.
We have, therefore, heard and re-heard, before a full court, the
argument which the parties have thought proper to present on the
original question, partly because we could not say that the question
was conclusively settled by an interlocutory order, and partly
because it is impossible to deny that there is an irreconcilable discrepancy in the two opinions and orders, heretofore announced in
this very cause. We have given to the question a very careful consideration, and are now prepared to pronounce the judgment, which
is, in our opinion, demanded by the law.
For the purpose of introducing this question in its general aspect,
we need to state no more than that Isaac Pennock devised to his
wife Martha all his real estate for life, and all his personal estate
"absolutely, having full confidence that she will leave the surplus
to be divided, at her decease, justly among my children." The
mother is now dead, and the children claim that the bequest of the
personal estate was a trust for their benefit, and have filed their
petition against their mother's executor for an account. The argument in support of the petition is, that the words which I have
quoted from the will are of a technical character, and do of themselves, import a trust, and that such is here the proper construction
of them, unless there are other expressions controlling them, and
showing a contrary intent.
Certainly, the principles of equity are part of our common law.
It is the very essence of common or customary law, that-it consists
of those principles and forms which grow out of the customs and
habits of the people. It is, therefore, involved in its very nature,
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that only so much of the English law, as is adapted to our circumstances and customs, is properly recognized as part of our common
law. This same principle is most emphatically involved in the cardinal maxim of all common law, cessante ratione legi8, cessat et ipsa
lex.
The technical effect, insisted upon as belonging to the words
already quoted, having never received a judicial sanction in this
State, until the first opening of this cause, and no rights having
ever been finally decided according to it, the question is still fairly
open for consideration, whether, under our law, those words have
any such technical character. It is, of course, a consideration of
some weight, that, besides our provincial existence, with many laws
and institutions peculiar to ourselves, we have existed as an independent State for three-quarters of a century, without learning that
such words have any technical meaning by our law, or are to be
construed differently from words of common parlance.
It is unquestionable that such modes of expression were formerly
used in the Roman and in the English law in order to create a
trust, and it was founded on good reason; but if that reason had
passed away before the settlement of this country, then the rule
which depended upon it was not imported as part of the law which
we brought from the mother country. That it remains of any
force in England after the reason of it has ceased, is not surprising;
for it is a common fate of institutions to outlive the causes which
gave rise to them, and thus, very often, the form survives the principle which it was designed to express.
It is acknowledged that the rule by which a trust is raised out of
such words, was imported into the English from the Roman law.
Its origin, therefore, in the Roman law, is a relevant subject of
inquiry; for if we find it arising then, not from the ordinary meanings of the words, but under the constraint of circumstances which
have no existence here, the force of the Roman rule will be much
impaired, if not destroyed. If, under their law, words of common
parlance acquired a technical value by reason of a peculiar institution; then that technical value depends upon circumstances, and
ceases with them, and the common meaning alone remains. To
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;onstrue such words, after that, as technical, is, in almost all cases,
to pervert the true meaning of the words, unless other parts of the
instrument clearly show that they are technically used.
It was part of the Roman law that the heir or devisee accepting
the estate of a decedent became at once charged with the payment
of all his debts, whether the estate was sufficient to discharge them
or not. Hence, and by way of compensation, he was not bound to
pay any of the legacies bequeathed by the testator; but this matter
was left by the law entirely to his discretion.-It was of the essence
of a Roman will, that the devisee should be universal successor to
the property and debts of the decedent. He was in form and substance what we call executor and sole devisee and legatee, with the
additional qualification that he (or they, for many might be joined)
was boufid personally for the debts, if he accepted the devise.
It is plain how restricted was the right of devise under such a
law. When all the testator's bequests could be defeated at the
pleasure of the devisee or instituted heir, he had no alternative but
to use words of confidence, recommendation or entreaty, as to any
legacies or special devises, and such words would be much more
likely to be regarded than the clearest imperative words.
Moreover, there were great and peculiar difficulties in making a valid will at all under the Roman law, owing to the excessive strictness
and complexity of the formalities required, and hence it was usual
to add a codicil, in which the testator entreated his heir at law, if
the will should not stand, to make the desired dispositions, or to
hold the property for the benefit of the persons named in the codicil. Here, again, words of entreaty are much more appropriate
than imperative words.
Under the circumstances they clearly
proved an intention to impose a duty on the general devisee as far
as was possible, and not merely to entrust him with -a discretion.
He intended a legacy; it was the law that made it discretionary in
disregard even of imperative words.
It is very plain that such an institution is at war with moral
principle, and it could not exist long without giving rise to many
aggravated cases of breach oi~such trusts, that would call loudly on
the law to interfere with the discretion of the heir or devisee, and
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enforce the clear intention of the testator. Hence arose an alteration of the law, and the prwtors were required to enforce trusts
that were created in this form. Under such circumstances the new
rule was a proper one; for it enforced the very duty imposed by
the testator, in the best form in which he was allowed to express it.
No doubt the law continued after the reason of it had ceased; but
then it contravened the intention of the testator by enforcing, as a
binding obligoation, what had been entrusted to the discretion of the
heir or devisee. These matters are fully illustrated in Domat, 2, 3,
1; 1 Spence Eq., Jurisd. 435; and in the Corpus Juris Civ.
Inst. 2, 20 and 25; Dig. 28, 1 and 29; 7 and 30; 31 and 32;
Code 6, 23 and 36.
Very similar was the origin of such trusts in England. The
power of devise existed among the Anglo-Saxons to its fullest
extent; and hence we might expect to find no such trusts among
them, and it is said that no Anglo-Saxon Will has been found containing the appointment of an executor charged with trusts. 1
Spence, Eq. Jur. 23, quoting Hickes Dissert. 37. But after the
Norman conquest, and under the strict principles of feuds, devises
of lands were not allowed. Hence the frequent resort to conveyances in trust, in order to be able to make provision for younger
children, and for other purposes.
These trusts were at first of no
binding obligation, but depended for their execution entirely upon
the honor of the grantee, and it was therefore very natural and
appropriate that words of recommendation, desire, entreaty and
confidence should be used. Dishonesty would, of course, often
occasion enormous grievances arising out of breaches of such confidence. It was very easy then for an English Chancellor to bring
in the Roman law to correct such evils. It was really enforcing
what was intended to be a trust, and changing the law to do it. It
was equity stepping in to correct the deficiencies of common law
institutions, and modifying them into accordance with the changing
customs and circumstances of the people. The rule thus properly
introduced has, of course, outlived the circumstances which gave it
birth, and which alone ought to maintain it.
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But the rule is fading away even in England. The disrelish with
which it is received by the legal and judicial minds of that country
may be seen in the doctrine of extreme certainty required as to the
subject and object of the recommendation. Wright vs. Atkh/ns,
Turner & Russell, 157; .Eiparte Payne, 2 Younge & Col. 646;
Tibbett8 vs. Tibbett8, id. 664; Harlanvs. Trigg, 1 Bro. C. C. 142;
and in the fact that it is degraded into the class of implied or constructive, and not express trusts; Lewin on Trusts, 66; Jeremy,
99; 2 Rop. Leg. 380, &c.; 2 Story Eq. s. 1074; 1 Atk. 619; and
that it is everywhere regarded as frustrating the will of the testator. 1 Simon's R. 540, 551; 1 Yes. & B. 315; 2 Story Eq., § 5,
1069-74.
Such words are not now regarded in England as creating a trust,
unless, on the whole, they ought to be construed as imperative.
2 Spence Eq. Jur. 65; 1 Bro. P. C. 481; 2 Ves. Jr. 632. And
the rule is treated as a mere artificial one that is to be strictly
limited to the demands of authority. It looks upon the words as
primafaciewords of trust; 7 Sim. 665; 2 Yes. Jr. 335, 533; yet
any words or expressions are eagerly seized hold of as indications
of a contrary intent. 1 Sim. 550, 552; 15 id. 33, 300; 3 Beav.
172; 5 C1. & Finn. 147, 153; 1 Bro. C. 0.143; 2 My. & K. 144.
Where it is apparent that the kindness or justice or discretion of
the devisee is relied on, no trust arises. 9 Sim. 319; 10 id. 1; 5
Mad. 434; 3 Beav. 154, 172, 176; 2 You. & Col. N. S. 582, 590;
2 Yes. Jr. 530, 533. And if it can be implied from the words that
a discretion is left to withdraw any part of the subject of the devise
from the object of the wish or request, or to apply it to the use of
the devisee, no trust is created. 2 My. & K. 201; 10 Sim. 5; 3
Beav. 173-4; 1 Bro. C. C. 179; 2 Id. 585; 3 Ves. Jr. 7; 5 Madd.
121; 1 Sim. & S. 389; 6 Beav. 342; 2 Cox, 334. See also, 2
Spence Eq. Jur. 65, et seq.
Now it is very plain that, on the former hearing of this cause,
Chief Justice Gibson regarded Mrs. Pennock as having the right to
withdraw the principal as well as the interest for her own use as
the absolute owner. He says, 13 Pa. State R. 258, "It is plain that
she was to use not only the income of the personal estate, but the
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estate itself, as if she were the untrammeled owner of it. What
other meaning can be given to the word 'absolutely?' We may
not strike it out, and if he meant not to give her a right to consume both principal and proceeds, he knew not what he said."
And the order of reference to ascertain "the value of the surplus
of the testator's personal property unconsumed at Mrs. Pennock's
death," was a consequence of that opinion. But it was not a legitimate consequence, as the cases last above referred to prove ; for
if she might apply the principle to her own use, then there can be
no trust, and the case ought to have been dismissed, not referred.
How could there be a trust, in the legal sense of the word? No
trust or contract that is uncertain is enforced by law; because the
law would have to define it, or in other words, create it, before
enforcing it. If this is a trust, it was so in the mother's life-time,
and could have been enforced as such. But how compel her to
hold, for the benefit of her children, that over which she had the
absolute control, and which she could spend as she pleased? If she
could thus use it, she was no trustee in the eyes of the law, and her
representative cannot be so treated after her death.
In fact, she did act all her lifetime as if she were the absolute
owner, and did convert almost the whole of the property to her own
use without any one of her children complaining of any breach of
trust. And it is not now the surplus, in fact, that they are seeking
to recover, but they are claiming from her executor an account of
their property, converted by their mother to her own use.
It cannot be denied that there is considerable discrepancy in the
English decisions on this subject, and nothing less can reasonably
be expected. An artificial rule like the one insisted on here, that
is founded on no great principle of policy, and that sets aside, while
it is professing to seek, the will of the testator, must continually be
contested and must be frequently invaded. And no one can read
the English decisions on this subject without suspecting that all
important wills, wherein similar words are found,'become the subjects of most expensive contests, and give rise to those family quarrels which are the worst and most bitter and distressing of all sorts
of litigation. We may well desire that such a rule shall never con-
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stitute a part of our law. It rejects the plain common sense of
expressions, and it is not in human nature to submit to it without a
contest.
Let us examine this will without the aid of this antiquated rule.
Isaac Pennock says, "I will and bequeath unto my dear wife, Martha
Pennock, the use, benefit and profits of all my real estate during
her natural life, and also all my personal estate of every description,
including ground-rents, bank stocks, bonds, notes, book debts, goods
and chattels, absolutely, having full confidence that she will leave
the surplus to be divided at her decease justly among my children."
Now, it is plain that if the words of confidence were left out, Mrs.
Pennock would have taken the personal estate absolutely. What
did he intend by those words of confidence? Evidently to commit
all the personal property to the discretion of his wife. He expected
her to use it as she pleased, and to leave what shall remain at her
death "justly" among his children; but he enjoined nothing. His
will was to give her the power of disposal, because he had confidence
in her. He intended no interference with or guidance of her discretion; but trusted all to a mother's heart. Yet this is the intention
which the law is expected to guide. And in order to enforce this
demand, it is insisted that she had but a life estate in the personal
property. But the testator excludes this construction, for he places
the real estate "for life" in contrast with the personal estate "absolutely ;" and contrasted expressions cannot be equivalent. And
yet, without forcing this construction, this case is at an end, unless
it be insisted that the mother took no estate at all for herself, which
is too absurd to be thought of. And as to the word "surplus," it
can have no other meaning than the one above given, and that given
by Chief Justice Gibson in the opinion above referred to. The view
here taken of the words of confidence, is further confirmed by other
parts of the will, where he, with "perfect confidence" and "full
confidence," entrusts his children to the kindness of their mother;
here surely he was intending no legal trust. If the will of the
testator was to give to his wife the property, to be disposed of at
her discretion, it is not for the Court to say that she has exercised
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that discretion badly; and it is impossible to say wherein, under a
change of circumstances, he would have exercised it differently.
We may now add that we know of no American case wherein the
antiquated English rule has been adopted, and that, as it is now
regarded even in England, this case would not now be governed by
it. 1 Bro. 0. C. 179; 2 Id. 285; 5 Madd. 118; 6 Bear. 542 ; 2
Younge & Col. 590; 2 Cox, 354; 3 Ves. Jr. 7; 15 Sim. 33; 1 Id.
542; 5 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 49; see also 2 Pa. State R. 131; and
herein we agree with the learned judge of the Court below.
It is not to be disputed, that these views are directly opposite to
those expressed by this Court, when this cause was first heard; but
we cannot help it. We are bound to decide this cause upon our
present views of the law. And such changes of opinion in the
progress of a cause are not at all uncommon, owing to the increase
of information or the change of judicial functionaries, or both. The
case of Shaw vs. Lawles8, 5 Clark & Fin. 129, is an illustration of
this, and it belongs to the class of cases we have been discussing.
One Lord Chancellor declared it a case of trust, and a new Chancellor granted a re-hearing, and declared the reverse, and his decree
was affirmed in the House of Lords. Even in the present case, the
opinion first declared adopted the old English rule in all its stringency, while the second one obviously flinches from a full application of
a construction so artificial and unnatural. Such vacillations are to
be expected where an unusual rule comes first to be applied. It is
well to declare at once, and before any wrong is consummated by
our judgment, that the rule has no foundation in any of our customs
or institutions, and no place in our law.
Our conclusions are-st. Words in a will expressive of desire,
recommendation and confidence are not words of technical, but of
common parlance, and are not prima facie sufficient to convert a
devise or bequest into *atrust; and the old Roman and English rule
on this subject is not part of the common law of Pennsylvania.
2d. Such words may amount to a declaration of trust when it
appears, from other parts of the will, that the testator intended not
to commit the estate to the devisee or legatee, or the ultimate disposal of it to his kindness, justice or discretion.
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3d. By this will the absolute ownership of the personal property
of Mr. Pennock is given to his widow, with an expression of mere
expectation that she will use and dispose of it discreetly as a mother,
and that no trust is created thereby.
DECREE, January 27, 1853.-This cause came on to be heard on
an appeal from the decree of the Orphans' Court of Chester county,
and was argued by counsel; and thereupon, on conideration thereof,
it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that all the orders and decrees
made in the said Orphans' Court and in this Court, since the appeal
from the first decree of the said Orphans' Court sustaining the demurrer of the respondents, and dismissing the bill or petition of the
complainants, be vacated and set aside; and that the said first decree
of the said Orphans' Court be affirmed, and that the parties do
severally pay their own costs.

PhiladelphiaNisi Prus. February, 1853.
M1ARY SMITH VS. REBECCA KRAMER.
In the trial of a question of insanity, evidence of hereditary taint is competent to.
corroborate direct proof.

This action of ejectment, for two messuages in Philadelphia, came
on to be tried before Mr. Justice Gibson, at the sittings at Nisi.
Pris, on the 14th of February, 1853. Both parties claimed under
Captain Arrowsmith, a retired mariner, who had attained a competence: the plaintiff, his sister, by descent as the last of her father's
issue; the defendant, his housekeeper, as his devisee. The fact in
contest was his sanity. There was no evidence of practice or imbecility; but the plaintiff's witnesses testified to acts of sudden and
unprovoked passion, violence, wildness, extravagance, and eccentricity; and, in order to corroborate the inference from them, her
counsel offered the deposition of Susan Arrowsmith, the widow of
one of the testator's brothers, that the testator's father was insane
towards the close of his life; that one of the testator's two uncles,
on the father's side, was insane, and the other imbecile; that his
23
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two aunts, on the same side, and their children, were insane; that a
son of one of them is in a mad-house; and that her own husband
was mentally disqualified before his death. The admission of the
deposition was opposed, on the ground that the legitimate inquiry
was into the state of the testator's mind, not that of another; and
that it did not follow, that because the testator's father and his collateral relations were insane, that he must have been so too.
The point was elaborately argued on principle and authority by
Sheppard and David_Paul Brown for the plaintiff, and G. S.
Biddle and Pancoast for the defendant.
GIBsoN, J.-I admit the deposition without hesitation, notwithstanding the dicta of Mr. Shelford, (Treat. on Lunacy, 59,) and Mr.
Chitty, (Mled. Jurisp. 355,) that it is an established rule of law not
to admit proof of insanity in other members of the family in civil
or criminal cases. Established! When, where, and by whom?
Certainly not by the House of Lords in MfcAdam vs. IJWalker, 1
Dow's Par. Ca. 148, the only case cited for it, for the question
there was avowedly dodged. That high Court would not shock
common sense by affirming the order of the Scotch Court of Session; nor would it gratuitously reverse it, when the decision could
be safely put on another ground. The authority of a judgment
appealed from, and left in dubio, cannot be very great. Sir Samuel
Romilly's argument, against the evidence, was rested on the fecundity and interminableness of collateral issues; and Mr. Chitty seems
to have had a glimpse of the same idea, when he said the course is
to confine the evidence to the mental state of the party. But every
new fact, though it open a new field of inquiry, is not collateral.
It may bear directly on the fact in contest; and, where it does so,
it is not in the power of the Court to shut it out. A collateral
issue is such as would be raised by allowing a party to put a question to a witness on cross-examination, in regard to a fact palpably
unconnected with the cause, in order to afford an opportunity to
,discredit him by contradicting him; but does not proof of hereditary
madness bear directly on the condition of the mind, which is the
subject of investigation ? What if the point had been ruled by the
Chancellor and law judges in the House of Lords? Profoundly
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learned in the maxims of the law, they were profoundly ignorant
of the lights of physiology ; yet, free from the presumptuousness of
which ignorance is, the foster-father, they refused to rush on the
decision of a question to which they felt themselves incompetent.
Mr. Chitty fancifully puts the solution of questions of insanity on
'As the imputation," he says,
the doctrine of legal presumptions.
"'iscontrary to the natural presumption of adequate intellect, the
deficit should be established by direct and positive evidence, and
not merely by conjectural or probable'proof." If that be law, a
question of insanity is the only one in which positive evidence is
required, and circumstantial evidence to corroborate is rejected.
Why is evidence of an old grudge admitted against a prisoner, as a
remote proof of malice, if the remote proof of hereditary insanity
may not be given by him to rebut it; and why should the presumption of sanity be allowed to overbear the presumption of innocence,
the strongest of them all? I admit that hereditary insanity will
not itself make out a case for or against a member of the family;
but to say that it may not corroborate what Mr. Chitty calls direct
and positive proof, without defining it, staggers all belief. In a
measuring cast, it ought to prevail. He says harsh conduct, bursts
of passion, or displays of unnatural feeling, will not, of themselves,
establish insanity. Be it so. But because the springs of such
actions are concealed, are they never to be laid bare, and shown to
be seated in the blood? When it is admitted by Mr. Chitty and
Mr. Shelford themselves, that insanity is a descendible quality, they
give up the argument. There can be nothing unreasonable in
referring wild, furious, and unnatural actions, not otherwise accounted for, to the aberrations of a mind, the reflex of that of a
crazy father. Mr. Taylor, a distinguished lecturer on Medical
Jurisprudence in Guy's Hospital; London, says that, "in making a
diagnosis of a case of insanity, the first question put is commonly
in reference to the present or past existence of the disorder in other
members of the family.. There can be no doubt, from the concurrent testimony of many writers on insanity, that a disposition to
the disease is frequently transmitted from parent to child, through
many generations. M. Esquirol has remarked, that this hereditary
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taint is the Most common of all the causes to which insanity can be
referred." (Taylor on Med. Jurisp. 502.) M. Esquirol was, in
1838, and perhaps is still, the principal physician of the hospital
for the insane at Charenton, in France, and a member of the Royal
Academy of Medicine at Paris. His tables of insanity are held in
high repute by not only the physicians of France, but of Europe.
Well might 'Mr. Taylor say that these things ought to be borne in
mind by medical jurigts. The knowledge attained by men, of a
subject with which they hive grappled all their lives, ought surely
to prevail against knowledge gleaned from the hornbooks of a profession to which the gleaners did not belong. Strange that a
source of information, open to every one else, should be closed to
those who are to pass on the fact. Every man has observed that
there are families, through which insanity has been handed down
for generations; and why should the probability of hereditary
madness be excluded, when probabilities in other cases are weighed;
especially when it is known that a proclivity to theft, intemperance,
lying, cheating, and almost all other moral vices are as transmissible as gout, consumption, deafness, blindness, and almost all other
constitutional diseases ? It is supposed by the million that insanity
is a disease of the mind, not of the body. Ridiculous. If it were,
it could never be cured; for the mind cannot take physic, or be
separately treated; yet the statistics of the insane exhibit a great
number of cures; and the time is fast coming when insanity will be
considered the most manageable disease that flesh is heir to.
An objection to an inquisition which does not disclose the specific nature of the ancestor's infirmit7. might stand in a different
light; but testimony which brings the fact of madness home to
him ought to be received like evidence of family likeness, which,
though less reliable, was allowed to be corroborative proof of paternity in the Douglass Peerage Case in 1767, and again in the Townsend Peerage Case in 1843. Lord Mansfield said in the former,
that he had always considered likeness as an argument of a child
being the son of a parent; that a man may survey ten thousand
people before he sees two faces exactly alike, and that, in an army
of a hundred thousand men, every man may be-known from an-
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other; that if there should be a likeness in feature, there may be
a difference in the voice,- gesture, or other characters; whereas
family likeness runs generally through all of these; for that in
everything there is a resemblance, as of feature, voice, attitude,
and action. Might he not have added the diathesis of the brain ?
He doubtless might, if the point had been mooted. In prosecutions
for bastardy, the practice in the Quarter Sessions was, in my day,
not exactly to give the child in evidence, but to put it before the
jury, sometimes by the prosecutor, and sometimes by the putative
father. But ancestral irregularity in the action of the brain is
more'frequently transritted than any resemblance in form or feature; and it is difficult to imagine an objection to evidence of it for
purposes of corroboration.
The defendant excepted to the foregoing ruling; but examined
witnesses who had been in familiar intercourse with the testator
during many years without having observed anything strange or
eccentric in his conduct; and the jury, having been out fifty hours,
declared they never could agree; whereupoh they were discharged.

Philadelphia Common Pleas. February, 1853.
BOROUGH OF FRANKFORD ET AL. VS. LENNIG.
1. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, under the acts of 1803 and
1818, have jurisdiction to authorize the construction of wharves, &c., in the river
Delaware, as far north as the mouth of Frankford Creek.
2. But the Board has no jurisdiction out of the tide-way of the river, and cannot
authorize such constructions in the creek itself.
3. The Board of Wardens cannot confer any right on the owners of land bordering
on the river to encroach upon its channel, so as to create a purresture,or public
nuisance.
4. The owners of land in Pennsylvania, bordering on a navigable river, have not
the right of soil to the centre of the stream. They have, however, the right to
erect wharves or buildings to ordinary low water mark; and this right, in the
port of Philadelphia, is not, it seems, dependent on the license of the Board of
Wardens.
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5. A gradual alteration of, the channel of a navigable stream will control the rights
of the owners of adjacent land to erect wharves therein.
6. A Court of Equity will not interfere by injunction in the case of a public nuisance
where there exists any doubt of the character or legality of the act complained
of, but will leave the parties to an indictment, or direct an issue.

The facts of this case appear in the opinion of the Court, which
was delivered by
ALLISON, J.-The complainants in'the bill filed are the Council
and inhabitants of the Borough of Frankford, in the County of
rhihldelphia, and Amos Thorp, Albert G. Roland, Nathan Hillis,
and James Brooks ;-they complain that the respondent has interfered with and obstructed the navigation of the Frankford Creek;
first, by a wharf constructed in the year 1843, along the south
bank, and, as they assert, at one or more points into the channel
of the stream; and by a continuation of said wharf now, or at the
time the bill was filed, in progress of construction, of the additional
length of 635 feet, which, with a pier 30 feet long by 50 feet in
breadth, built at the eastern termination of the wharf, in five feet
water at low tide, and in the mouth of the Creek, makes the new
construction 665 feet in length from the eastern end of the old
wharf.
The complainants further charge that about one-third of the
extension is carried, in part, into the bed or channel of the Creek
beyond low water mark, and crosses it in an oblique northeasterly
direction from its southern towards its northern bank or shore,
leaving, at the mouth of the stream, a channel of but 15 feet in
width between the upper end of the pier and the flats on the northernmost side of the stream.
It is also stated that the Borough of Frankford was incorporated
March 17th, 1800; that Frankford Creek, which forms part
of the boundary of said Borough, from its mouth to the land opposite the race bridge across the Bristol Road, or Main street, in
Frankford, by an act passed the 16th day of January, 1799, was
declare*d to be a public highway of the width of 66 feet, and that
Amos Thorp, A. G. Roland, Nathan Hillis, and James Brooks,
citizens of Frankford, have used said creek as a public highway;
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that some of them are the owners of valuable real estate, mills and
wharf property, fronting on said stream or Tacony Creek, above
the'bridge, and that a number of the citizens of said borough have,
for a long 'time past, and are now carrying on manufactures of
various kinds, and other varieties of business, all of which depend,
as well as the value of the property of complainants and others, on
the uinobstructednavigation of the creek, and communication
thereby with the ridr' Delaware.
The bill prays 1fo
b in injunction to restrain the completion of the
wharves, the use 'or 'maintenance of the same by respondent, and
that he be prohibitdd from, in any way, lessening the channel of
Frankford 'Creek, or interfering -with the free navigation of the
same.
Th' defendant, in his affidavit, alleges that the extension of his
wharf'and pier haVe''been constructed under a license granted to
himself and Frederick Lennig, who constitute the firm of Nicholas
Lennig & Co., by the Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia.
Respondent denies 'that either of the said wharves are, or will be,
an 'bbstruction to the navigati6n of the creek; that his only object
has 'been to deeieu-'its channel, and thereby improve its navigation.
He also says th'atothe wharf built in 1843 does not encroach upon
the channel'of-the stream, and that the mouth of the creek had
been deterioratijigfor a number of years, by deposits of mud, especially' on 'its northern shore; that, by the wharf last built, the
channel will be deepened, by preventing the spread of the water
'over the fiats upon the lower side, where it efnpties into the Delaware that it will not lonly not interfere with the action of the ti.dal
current'in enterinhg the creek, but improve it, and that he has
removed the deposits of mud from the channel at the outlet, greatly
to its' advantage.
The affidavit of defendant further states, that in 1843, when the
first wharves were built, the current of the creek at the mouth was
to the 'north of the pier and wharf now being built, which, at that
time was dry flt at low water.
Several grave questions arise in the determination of this issue;
the 'frst 'in iihportance, as it affects not only the controversy in
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hand, but other interests of vast magnitude, is the protection
claimed by the respondent, under the license issued by the Wardens
of the Port of Philadelphia, bearing date the 6th day of December,
A. D. 1852, which authorizes "Nicholas Lennig and Company, of
Bridesburg, Philadelphia County, to erect a pier or wharf in the
river Delaware, at the mouth of Frankford creek, not to exceed
30 feet long and 50 feet broad, in accordance with the following
described lines and boundaries, to wit: commencing on a line with
the piles, as driven along the south side of said creek, at the distance of 635 feet from the east end of his wharf on said creek, as
per plan on file in this office," &c. The act establishing the Board
of Wardens for the Port of Philadelphia, was passed the 29th day
of March, 1803. The Board consisted of one Master and six
Assistant Wardens, four of whom were required to be inhabitants
of the City of Philadelphia, one of the Northern Liberties, and one
of the District of Southwark.
The 12th section of the act pfovides, "that when and so often
as any person shall be desirous to extend any wharf, or other building of -the nature of a wharf, or cause any such wharf or building
to be -made in the tide-way of -the river Delaware, from any part of
the City or Liberties of Philadelphia, such persons shall make application to the Board of Wardens," &c. The only other act defining
in terms the authority of the Wardens, as applicable to this part of
the case, is the supplemental law of February 7th, 1818, which differs from the act of 1803, principally, in expressing, with mbre
minuteness, the extent of their territorial jurisdiction, embracing
the- City of Philadelphia, the Northern Liberties, the District of
Southwark, and Sand Bar Island in front of the City. It is becoming important, therefore, to ascertain what was intended by the
Legislature, by the terms .Libertiesand NYorthern Liberties, as used
in the connection in which they stand.
By'the conditions or concessions agreed upon in England, on the
11th of July, 1681, between William Penn and the purchasers of
land in the province, the proprietary *ias to lay out a large town
or city, in the proportion of 200 acres of land for every 10,000
acres bought from him; and each purchaser became entiled to 10
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acres in the city for every 500 acres thus*acquired; this plan was
found to be impracticable, and a compromise was agreed upon.
Penn directed a survey of over 16,000 acres, which lay to the
north, west and south of the city, for the use and benefit of the
first adventurers, and were designated the Liberties, or liberty lands
of Philadelphia. Under the new system, original purchasers of 500
acres became entitled to 490 acres in the county, and 10 acres of
liberty land on the west, or 3 acres on the east of the Schuylkill,
and a city lot embracing about one-third of an acre.
The original survey of these lands was lost at an early period,
and in 1703, a warrant was issued for a re-survey of all the lands
within said Liberties, and the manor of Springetsbery, according
to their original lines of survey, or the present boundaries of the
several tracts possessed by the settlers therein. An ancient plan
of 'the Northern Liberties, including the manor of Springetsbery,
supposed to be a return to said survey, is endorsed. This belongs
to the Surveyor General's office, Northern Liberties. From these
historical facts, it is evident that the terms incorporated in the acts
of 1803 and 1818 had, at a very early day, a well determined signification, coeval in their origin with the birth of the colony, and,
like the colony itself, undergoing in later years a material alteration; nor does it detract from the force of the argument, that the
original boundaries of the liberty lands are involved in some degree
of obscurity; for the best lights to which access can now be had,
Holmes' Map of 1687, and Reed's Map, with explanations, published in 1774, after tracing their boundaries, as beginning
on Vine street, then up the river Delaware to the mouth of
Coachquenawque, or Pegg's Run, they then receded from the
Delaware, to avoid the lands at ffartsfelder; now the incorporated
District of the Northern Liberties, embracing 850 acres, and located
six years before Penn's colony came out under a patent from
Governor Andros; and also the settlement at Shackamaxon, now
Kensington; whether they again touched the Delaware is a matter
of some doubt; but it is certain they extended north to the Frankford Creek, below the junction of the Tacony and Wingohocking,
and covered the whole of the territory westward, afterwards known
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as the Northern Liberties, and subsequently as the township of the
Unincorporated Northern Liberties, a term which was applied to
the Delaware front north of the City, including the lands of Hartsfelder, and others not embraced in the original survey of the liberty
land to. the mouth of Frankford Creek, and westward to the Schuylkill River.
As early as 1768, the Provincial Assembly passed an act for
raising, by lottery, X1000, for purchasing a public landing in the
Northern Liberties.
Then follow a series of legislative acts, establishing, beyond controversy, the meaning of the term as applicable to the Delaware
front above the City, some of which may be referred to in the following order:
First, the act of 80th, 1791, empowering the inhabitants of that
part of the township, between Fourth Street and the Delaware,
and Vine Street and Pegg's Run, to make regulations for lighting, &c.
March 28th, 1803.-An act was passed incorporating "The
Commissioners and Inhabitants of that part of the township of the
Northern Liberties, lying between the west side of Sixth Street
and the river Delaware, and between Vine Street and Cohocksink
Crek."
The act of March 16th, 1819, changing the name of the incorporated district to its present title, and its western boundary to the
middle of Sixth street. The first section of the act of March 6th,
1820, incorporates "The Commissioners and Inhabitants of the
Kensington District of the Northern Liberties." Richmond District, February 27th, 1842, was carved out of the "Township of
the Uniicorporated Northern Liberties." And latest in order is
the act of April 1st, 1848, which provides "that the inhabitants of
that part of the township of the Unincorporated Northern Liberties, in the County of Philadelphia, known as the Village of Bridesburg, be and the same is hereby erected into a borough, &c.
Beginning at the junction of Frankford Creek and the river Delaware," &c.; covering the very point in controversy. The recital
of these acts of Assembly is, we think, a conclusive answer to the
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argument so strenuously pressed against the right of the Wardens
to exercise their functions beyond the limits of the incorporated
District of the Northern Liberties, or Cohocksink Creek, where it
empties into the Delaware.
But, although free from doubt upon the question of the jurisdiction of the Wardens, as far north as the mouth of Frankford Creek,
it is equally clear that the respondent has exceeded the privilege
granted by the license, for the Wardens have authorized nothing
more than a right to build a wharf or pier, 80 by 50 feet, in the
river Delaware, commencing 635 feet from the old wharf: we look
in vain to the license for a grant to build the connecting wharf in
the mouth of the Creek, or Delaware river below low water mark,
a distance, perhaps, of 200 feet. To low water mark the respondent is owner of the soil, and has a right to build of his own motion.
In Pennsylvania, the land covered at high and bare at low tide,
belongs to the owner of the adjacent soil. 1restang vs. Powell, 1
Wharton, 528; Jones vs. Janney, 8 W. & S. 448; Naglee vs. Ingersoll, 7 Barr, 201. And he has a right, in a port town within
this limit, to erect a wharf for his own convehience or profit.
The public have, however, an easement over this space, until
rescued by the owner, and appropriated to his own use; for, when
covered with water, it is a part of the river, and any one can navigate, fish, pass or repass over it at high tide. Flats have always
been considered an appurtenance to an adjoining river front, and
pass by a conveyance of the fast land, unless expressly excluded;
but, being part of the navigable bed of the river at high water, the
State has always claimed to control its use, as part of the common
highway; but this does not appear to be the case with us, for the
act of 1808, first directing a license to be obtained for building a
wharf in the tide-way of the Delaware, afterwards, in prescribing
its penalty, says, if any person shall build, &c., below low water
viark, &c. The act of 1818, it is true, contains no such qualification, but Juldge Bell, delivering the opinion of the Court in Naglee
vs. Ingersoll, gives this construction to that act, and says, the
failure to recognize the owner's right to build his wharf to low
water mark, without the permission of the Wardens, was, perhaps,
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an inadvertance, and then holds that "to low water mark he might
build of his own mere motion; further than that his violation -was
dependent upon, and to be governed by, the discretion of others,
whom the lord of the soil has intrusted with jurisdiction over the
subject."
The act of April 15th, 1850, expressly limits the authority of the
Wardens to beyond low water mark; it provides that the 5th section of the act of February 4th, 1846, "shall not be construed to
diminish the powers and authorities of the Board of Wardens,
relating to the extension of wharves beyond low water mark, into
the tide-way of the Delaware, as conferred by the act of February
7th, 1818."
And, in further support of this view of the law, might be cited
the analogous act of 20th March, 1805, conferring on the Wardens
like power to regulate the wharf lines upon the river Schuylkill,
from the lower falls of the Delaware, beyond common 16w water
7nark.
For two-thirds of the construction then between the pier and old
wharf, it was altogether unnecessary for the respondent, under any
view of the case, to ask as a right, of others that which belonged
exclusively to himself; and, it is clear, that between these points
no license was attempted to be granted by the Wardens ; it would
even seem the respondent so understood it, from the fact of the
piles, along the south side of the creek, having been driven by him,
before the warrant now set up as his protection was obtained.
'The erection of the connecting wharf therefore, so far as it extends into the bed of the river below low water, is clearly a purpresture, an encroachment and intrusion on the soil belonging to
the State; or an effort to appropriate to defendant's individual
advantage, a benefit common to the entire community.
The rivers of Pennsylvania are not subject to the common law
rule, that owners on the banks have the right of soil to the middle
of the stream, and the building of a wharf, without a license from
the State, or those to whom it has delegated its authority, into the
Delaware, beyond low water mark, is a clear encroachment upon
the rights of the public, constituting, as it does, a permanent occupation, without license, of a part of a great public highway.
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It may be a question, as to whether the obstruction to the navigation west of the pier is in fact in the river proper, or confined to
the creek alone. If the latter, then it is a nuisance beyond all question, extending as it does into and obliquely across the navigable
channel of a highway, which the public are entitled to enjoy free
from all let or hindrance; the permission of the wardens could confer no right to encroach upon the channel of the creek, their jurisdiction extending to the tide-way of the river only, as it now stands.
No one can doubt, who examines the premises, that the width of the
channel is materially abridged, and although the depth of the
waters may be increased by their confinement, as the defendant
asserts in his affidavit, yet he cannot, without the sanction of law,
be permitted to appropriate to himself that which belongs to the
State, or is a privilege, the enjoyment of which is free and unrestricted, upon the ground of alleged improvement; for it is the
highway as established by law, which the public have the right to
use, and as this wharf crosses what is admitted to have been a navigable part of the stream or outlet of the creek, it is an unauthorized
interference with that right.
Nor will the defence set up in the affidavit avail, that the former
mouth of the creek was to the north of its present outlet, for it is
not denied, that whatever change has taken place has been a gradual one; and it is well settled that the channel follows alteratiohs
thus effected; though it would be different if the change had been
caused by the sudden action of the water, resulting from flood or
an obstruction placed in the stream, 3 Kent Com., sect. 428;
Ball v. Slack, 2 Wharton, 541. But where the change is an
insensible one, and the stream, so to speak, selects its own
course, the rights of parties are controlled by, and follow such
alterations.
The question, however, as to whether the pier constructed under
a license emanating from legal authority is, or is not a nuisance,
remains yet to be passed upon; and the affidavits presented by
both sides, conflicting and contradictory as they are in the highest
possible degree, call for the intervention of another tribunal to
determine this question.
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As a general rule; Courts of Equity will not interfere where a
doubt exists as to the character and illegality of an act complained
of, until they have been ascertained by a jury, Attorney General v.
Cleaver, 18 Ves. 218. If a jury should find the pier to be such
an obstruction to the navigation as to amount to a nuisance, the
authority under which it has been built, would not avail to prevent
its abatement. The wardens cannot license a nuisance, they cannot close up or seriously impede or obstruct the navigation of a
stream declared to be a public highway; no such authority is conferred upon them. As well might it be contended, that a supervisor of roads or streets could improve one highway by blocking up
the entrance to another; but for the reason already assigned, we
sJiall turn the parties over to an indictment, or an issue in the Common Pleas, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the pier is or is
not a nuisance; and in consequence of the lapse of ten years intervening since the first erection, during which period the complainants
may fairly be presumed to have been aware of the alleged wrong,
the same disposition is made of this part of the case.
In relation, however, to so much of the new wharf as extcnds
into the channel of the creek, or river Delaware-erected, as we
take it to be, without authority of any kind to justify it, and therefore contrary to law; which is prejudicial to the interests of the
community and the rights of individuals, an injunction is awarded
to restrain its use, occupation or enjoyment by the respondent, or
those acting under his authority. This is a much stronger case
than Commonwealth v. Bush, 2 Harris, 189, in which a special and
subsequently a perpetual injunction was granted to restrain defendant building upon a part of a public square, in the city of Pittsburg, which had been sold out in lots by the corporate authorities.
And the nuisance is a more obvious one, because more extensive
than that for which an injunction was awarded in Commissioners
v. Long, 1 Parsons, 148.
The two cases just cited, and Jordon v. B. B. Comp., 3 Wharton, 512, establish the damage arising from an obstruction of this
kind, to be that which is designated irreparable injury, for which
an action at law affords no sufficient remedy.
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Upon the questions raised upon the argument, it is sufficient to
say we are of opinionFirst. The complainants are proper parties to the bill, and entitled to a standing in Court.
Second. The complainants were not bound to appeal from the
decision of the Wardens, and are not therefore concluded by it;
the acts of 1803 and 1818, providing that when a license shall be
refused, the applicant may appeal. Other parties are not brought
within its provisions.
Third. A license to Nicholas Lennig & Co., Nicholas Lennig
being dead, Charles and Frederick Lennig, remaining members of
the firm surviving, and continuing the business under the old firm
designation, and the property belonging to the old firm, is a sufficient authority to the respondent to erect the pier designated in the
license.

In the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
BELL VS. THE STATE.

1

1. The utterance of obscene words in public, being a gross violation of public
decency and good morals, is indictable.
2. In a prosecution for the utterance of obscene language in public, it is not necessary that the words should be proven exactly as charged to have been spoken.

Bell was indicted in the Circuit Court of Blount County for the
utterance of grossly obscene language, "in public and in the hearing of divers citizens," the character and precise nature of which
are indicated by the opinion. At the September tefm, 18.50,
LUCKEY, Judge, presiding, there was a verdict of guilty, and judgment accordingly, and an appeal in error..
John B. Nelson for Bell. An indictment for words spoken,
where the words themselves constitute and are the gist of the
IThis case will be found reported 1 Swan's Tenn. Rep. 42, now about issuing
from the press. We are indebted to the kindness of the reporter for the sheets.
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offence, except for blasphemy, is without precedent, and cannot be
maintained.
But if it can be, the same strictness of proof as to the words
used is required, as in cases of libel: Whar. Cr. L. 88. The words
spoken must be set out exactly as spoken, and cannot be charged
according' to their substance, and the words so charged, or words
of precisely the same meaning, without the help of any implication
or intendment, must be proven.
Attorney
1 General for the State.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
McKIxNEY, J.-The plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted
in the Circuit Court of ]3lount, for the utterance of certain grossly
obscene words in public, and in the hearing of divers persons, in
the town of Louisville in said county. The different words alleged
to have been spoken, are set forth in three different counts. This
was necessary to the validity of the indictment, but we omit to
repeat them here; because of their extremely vulgar and offensive
character. It is sufficient to state, that they relate to acts of criminal intercourse alleged, by the defendant, to have taken place
between him and the daughters of Abraham Hartsell, and to a
loathsome disease, said by the defendant to have been contracted
by him from the wife of Hiram Hartsell.
Two questions are presented for our determination: First, is the
utterance of obscene words in public an indictable offence? And
if so, secondly, are the words proved sufficient to support the charges
in the indictment ?
Upon the first point, the argument for the plaintiff in error rests
upon the narrow and unsubstantial ground, that no precedent or
adjudication has been found in support of such an indictment.
Admitting this to be true, for the present, what does it establish?
If the case stated in the indictment falls within the operation of
clear, well defined, and well established principles of law, is it to
be urged against the maintenance of this prosecution, that no similar case has heretofore occurred calling for the like application of
such principles ? Surely not at this day. Are not innumerable
instances to be found in the modern Reports, both of England and
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America, in which the liberal, enlightened, and expansive principles of the common law have been adapted and applied to new
cases, for which no precedents were to be found, so as to meet the
ever varying condition and emergencies of society? And this must
continue to be so, unless a stop be put to all further progress of
society; and unless a stop be also put to the further workings of
depraved human nature, in seeking out new inventions to evade the
law.
What then are thewell established principles of the common law
applicable to the present case ?
The distinguished commentator on the- laws of England informs
us, that upon the foundations of the law of nature and the law of
revelation, all human laws depend, 1 El. Com. 42; The municipal
law looks to something more than merely the protection of the
lives, the ]iberty, and the property of the people. Regarding
Christianity as part of the law of the land, it respects and protects
its institutions; and assumes likewise to regulate the public aorals
and decency of the community. The same enlightened 6uthor (1
Vol. Com. 124) distinguishes between the absohite and relative
duties of individuals, as members of society. He shows very clearly
that, while human laws cannot be expected to enforce the former,
their proper concern is with social and relative duties. Municipal
law being intended only to regulate the conduct of men, considered
under various relations, as members of civil society; hence he lays
it down, that however abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his
practice, a man may be, provided he keeps his wickedness to him-'
self, and does not offend against the. rules of public decency, he is
out of the reach of human laws. But, says the learned writer, if he
make his vices public, though they be such as seem principally to
affect himself-as drunkenness, or the like-they then become, by
the bad example.4
se , of pernicious effect to society; -and, therefore, it is then 4. business of huma;.laws to correct them. See
also Bl. Com. 41, 42.
It is certainly true that, in England, many offences against good
morals and public decency, if committed in private, belong properly
and exclusively to the ecclesiastical courts. But it is equally true,
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that whenever they become public, so as thereby to become of pernicious example, or offensive to public morals and decency, they
fall within the proper jurisdiction of the temporal courts.
In the case of The King vs. Delard et als. (3 Burr. R. 1438),
which was an information for conspiracy, for putting a young girl
into the hands of a man of rank and fortune, for the purpose of
prostitution-Lord Mansfield laid it down, that, except as to those
cases appropriated to the Ecclesiastical Court, the Court of King's
Bench is the custus morum, or guardian of the morals of the people,
and has the superintendency of offences contra bonos mores; and
upon this ground, he says, both Sedley and Curl, who had been
guilty of offences against goood manners, were prosecuted in that
Court.
In 1 Russel on Crimes, (270, at top,) it is said that, "In general, all open lewdness, grossly scandalous, is punishable by indictment at the common law; and, says the author, (it appears to be
an established principle, that whatever openly outrages decency,
and is injurious to public morals, is a misdemeanor." So Blackstone lays it down, (4 Com. 64,) that any grossly scandalous and
public indecency is indictable, and punishable in the temporal courts
by fine and imprisonment.
These principles have been fully recognized by this Court. In
the case of Grisham and Ligon vs. Th State, (2 Yerger,) that
thorough common lawyer, the late Judge Whyte, declared that
"The common law is the guardian of the morals of the people, and
-their protection against offences notoriously against public decency
and good morals." And'he adds, in another part of the same opinion, "we have" the express authority of the common law, as
declared by the judges in the courts of justice, that all offences
against good morals are cognizable and punishable in the temporal
courts, that-are not-particularly'assigned to the spiritual court."
The books of reports, both of England and this country, abound
with cases where, upon these principles of the common law, convictions have been enforced for various offences against public morality
and decency, without the aid of any statutory enactment. And
surely it can be no reason for the relaxation of these salutary prin-
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ciples, but rather the contrary, that, in this country, we have no
CCspiritual court" to lend its aid in the suppression of the numerous
offences falling within the class now under consideration; and that
such of them as cannot be reached in the mode pursued in the case
before us, must "go unwhipt of justice."
It would be tedious to enumerate the cases in which offences have
been held indictable, as contra ono8 more-a few will suffice for
the present purpose. Public drunkenness, 4 Bi. Com. 41. All
indecent exposure of one's person to the public view, Id. 65, n. 25.
In the case of The Zing vs. Crunden, 2 Camp. 89, (1 Russ. on
Crimes, 802,) it was held an indictable offence to bathe in the sea
near inhabited houses, from which the person might be seen;
although the houses had been recently erected, and, previously
thereto, it had been used for persons, in great numbers, to bathe
at such place. And it was so held, for the reason "that whatever
place becomes the habitation of civilized men, there the laws of
decency must be enforced."
So it has been held by this Court, that if the master of a slave,
in his employ, permit such slave to pass about, in view of the public,
so meanly clad, as not to protect the person of such slave from
indecent exposure, the master is indictable for lewdness, or scandalous public indecency: 3 Humph. R. 203. And it may be laid down,
in general terms, that all such acts and conduct as are of a nature
to corrupt the public morals, or to outrage the sense of public
decency, are indictable, whether committed by words or.acts.
These adjudications, without citing others, we think furnish analogies -sufficiently strong to sustain the present prosecution. Are
the outrageously vulgar and obscene words found in this record, if
uttered in the ear of the public, less likely to shock any one's sense
of decency, and to corrupt the morals of society-not to speak of
their inevitable tendency to provoke'violence and bloodshed-than
the offences charged in the several adjudicated-cases above cited?
It does not so appear to us. But, where there is no analogy to be
drawn from any decided case, we hold that, upon the broad principles of the common law, which we have stated, this prosecution is
most amply sustained. Thus fortified by sound principles-princi-
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ples which lie at the foundation of every well regulated community
-(and resting on a basis so immutable,) we are the more indifferent
as to precedents exactly in point.
Secondly. It is argued that the words charged to have been
uttered, being the gist of the offence, they must be set forth with
the same particularity as in an indictment for libel; or for contemptuous words spoken to a magistrate in the execution of his
office; or for seditious words; and that, at least, the substance of
the words, as set forth in the indictment, must be proved. Hence,
it is insisted that a charge, importing that certain acts had been
done by the defendant, as stated by him, will not be supported by
proof that he said he would have done the acts, if opportunity had
been afforded. The present case, it may be remarked, is distinguishable from either of the cases cited. The gist of the offence
here, is not a specific libel upon a private individual; nor is it a
specific contempt to a public functionary; neither is it for a seditious or treasonable act towards the government; in all which cases
the principle relied upon unquestionably applies. The gist of this
offence is the gross violation - of good morals and public decency;
for which, according to the argument, there is no precedent to be
found; and if required, for the first time, to make one, as we hesitate not to do, we must be guided by principles sensible and practicable in themselves. If the criminality of the defendant's conduct
depends alone upon the flagrant outrage to public decency, by the
utterance of shamelessly obscene language in reference to certain
acts, can it, in reason, be of any consequence whether such language imported that he had done, or would do, the specific acts?
In either case the offence, so far as public decency is concerned, is
identically the same. To hold that the words must be laid exactly
as spoken, or that they must be proved as laid, would, perhaps, in
most cases, insure impunity to the offender; because almost every
one, not abandoned to all sense of decency, would instinctively turn
away his ear from hearing such revolting indecency.
But it is needless to pursue this unpleasant discussion farther, as
upon the third count the conviction may be well rested; and between
the words in that count, as laid and proved, there is no variance.
Let the judgment be affrmed.

